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Law and Morality of War 




“Part of our challenge is reconciling these two seemingly irreconcilable truths -- that war is sometimes necessary, 
and war at some level is an expression of human folly.” 
 
President Barack Obama 





Imagine that a single terrorist mastermind had planned and executed one of the largest 
and most deadly terrorist acts in history on United States soil.  Imagine that the mastermind was 
still on the loose, actively planning more terrorist attacks and managing an extensive network of 
terrorist cells across several sovereign nations.  He hides far from any known battlefield.  He 
does not wear a uniform.  He does not carry a weapon openly.  He is probably surrounded by 
women, children and others who may neither support nor even know his cause.  Technological 
advances help the terrorist mastermind spread his message and perpetrate acts of terror and 
similar advances aid the specialized team charged with hunting the terrorist.  If the United States 
were to target and kill the terrorist mastermind would it comport with principles of international 
law and traditional notions of just war theory?  
Consider another hypothetical.  You are the President of the United States and your national 
security personnel report that they have discovered the location of a known terrorist who poses 
some uncertain but approximately high level of threat to the United States.  He is a member of al 
Qaeda, but he is not known to be among their most actively violent members.  He has served in 
various roles supporting communications, recruiting and logistical functions of the organization.  
Your national security personnel present three options.  First, you could bomb the location where 
the suspected terrorist is thought to be hiding.  Second, you could dispatch a small elite force to 
kill the terrorist directly and confirm the terrorist’s death.  Finally, you could instruct the strike 
force to capture the terrorist.  Myriad policy considerations and variations of the facts would 
undoubtedly play a role in your decision-making, but placing these considerations and factual 
possibilities aside, what option is a legitimate exercise of your authority as commander in chief?              
Under facts loosely analogous to all of the scenarios just described the United States has chosen 
the option of targeted killing.  Adopted by the United States primarily in the wake of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, targeted killing has arguably become a favored tool for fighting al 
Qaeda and their supporters under the administration of Barack Obama.  According to Philip 
Alston, the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary 
executions, targeted killing specifically entails the “intentional, premeditated and deliberate use 
of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under [color] of law, or by an organized armed 
group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the 
perpetrator.”   
The Obama Administration asserts that the United States’ use of targeted killing comports with 
basic principles of international law. One high level official has stated that “this Administration 
has carefully reviewed the rules governing targeting operations to ensure that these operations 
are conducted consistently with law of war principles.”  John Brennan, Assistant to the President 
for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, recently stated that the United States uses “every 
lawful tool and authority available” in the war against al Qaeda and that the core values of the 
United States include “adhering to the rule of law,”
 
 whether the military action taken is 
clandestine or in plain sight.   
Despite assurances from various sources that the practice of targeted killing is lawful, the 
specific laws that apply or that should apply to targeted killing are subject to dispute in their 
application.  In turn the determination of the legality of targeted killing in its various forms 
warrants further consideration and the significant moral questions raised by targeted killing given 
traditional principles of just war theory constitute yet another inescapable layer of the analysis.  
Indeed, ignoring moral considerations in rote application of the law of war to terrorist fighters 
can result in severe consequences.  Kill-capture missions—a sub-species of targeted killings and 
the method employed in the raid resulting in the death of Osama bin Laden—serve as an apt lens 
through which to examine these interwoven issues given the prominent role kill-capture missions 
have taken in the war against al Qaeda.   
Kill-capture missions, defined succinctly, are organized raids conducted by special operations 
personnel for the purpose of strategically capturing or killing certain enemy targets, gathering 
information and disrupting enemy networks and capabilities.  According to unofficial sources, 
targets are pre-designated as a target for either capture or killing.  But, “whenever it is possible to 
capture a suspected terrorist, it is the unqualified preference of the [Obama] Administration to 
take custody of that individual”
 
—killing is not the administration’s asserted preference.  All 
told, the United States has operated “more than a couple thousand of these night operations over 
the last year” according to one U.S. General commanding in Afghanistan.  Kill-capture raids 
have garnered intense scrutiny but given their arguable success have weathered calls for the 
practice to end.  Given the logistical complexities of the war against al Qaeda and affiliated 
groups kill-capture missions have proven effective and the United States shows no signs of 
stopping the practice.  The Obama Administration’s remarks on this subject are telling of the 
future necessity of kill-capture missions:  “[g]oing forward, we will be mindful that if our nation 
is threatened, our best offense won’t always be deploying large armies abroad but delivering 
targeted, surgical pressure to the groups that threaten us.”  This approach to unconventional new 
enemies and threats, as President Obama himself has stated, “require[s] us to think in new ways 
about the notions of just war and the imperatives of a just peace.”   
This paper addresses how kill-capture missions can be reconciled with the underlying principles 
of just war theory.  In particular, this paper grapples with the traditional combatant-civilian 
distinction in just war theory.  Given the moral and legal nuances of kill-capture missions in 
scenarios like those sketched at the outset this paper argues that the traditional combatant-
civilian framework is not conceptually suitable for war against belligerents like al Qaeda.  Where 
traditional just war theory has embodied a clear distinction between its two foundational 
categories—combatant and civilian—the military practices essential to fight terrorism in its 
various forms do not fit neatly into the just war tradition’s established moral and legal 
framework.  Nor do the activities of terrorist organizations.  The new framework advanced in 
this paper therefore calls for a third category for fighters such as al Qaeda, called alternative 
belligerents, that evolves out of traditional just war distinctions and their rationales.   
Rather than considering combatants and civilians as exclusive categories this paper argues for an 
approach wherein groups of fighters such as al Qaeda overlay aspects of moral and legal ground 
exclusive to both combatants and civilians.  This new framework, the argument goes, is useful 
for navigating the legal and moral sticking points of kill-capture missions and targeted killing 
more broadly.  This paper will apply the framework to consider the question of when, if ever, 
combatants should capture rather than kill a target in scenarios like those at the outset of this 
paper.  Such a question, if we see it as worthy of general moral consideration beyond rote 
application of select black letter law of war principles, hinges on the just war distinction between 
combatant and civilian as essentially a threshold matter.  The framework advanced in this 
paper—the traditional framework of distinct combatants and civilians garnished with a separate 
conceptual category for alternative belligerents typified by groups of fighters like al Qaeda—will 
aid in answering such questions.      
Part I of this paper outlines the traditional just war combatant-civilian framework and the basic 
legal doctrines currently thought to apply to targeted killing.  Part II advances a new conception 
of the traditional combatant-civilian framework that incorporates the third category of alternative 
belligerents by showing how groups such as al Qaeda are neither combatants nor non-combatants 
in the just war sense and thus compel the creation of a third conceptual category.  Part III of the 
paper applies the new framework to the kill-capture mission scenario and its core tension 
between the duty to capture or kill while addressing concerns and weaknesses of the new 
framework before concluding.       
 
Traditional Combatants in Just War Theory  
This section provides the brief but necessary legal and theoretical background for 
supporting the claim that a third category beyond the traditional combatant-civilian distinction is 
useful.  The section outlines the just war principles from which a new category of combatant 
would derive and highlights the “black letter” legal principles in international law to which 
normative claims advanced in this paper could, and likely would, apply in practice.   
Just War Theory: A Hard Line Between Combatants and Civilians 
In traditional just war theory combatants “as a class are set apart from the world of 
peaceful activity” and are strictly separate from civilians.  This view is codified in the Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Protocol I) which asserts that “[t]he 
civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protections against dangers 
arising from military operations…[and]…shall not be the object of attack.”  Together the 
provisions of Protocol I “adopt a bright line interpretation that establishes two privileged classes: 
combatants and civilians.”   
Just War Foundations of Combatant and Civilian Status 
Just war theory sees non-combatants, or civilians, as immune from intentional direct 
harm in the form of killing or otherwise.  In order to intentionally kill, there must be a 
justification.  It is thus critical to understand the moral line between combatants and non-
combatants in the just war tradition.  In traditional just war theory fighting on behalf of a state as 
opposed to as part of a group unattached to a state, “was one of the defining principles 
of…combatant status.”  The concept of fighting on behalf of a state is accompanied in the just 
war tradition by the “customary acceptance in the Western world that members of the armed 
forces may in war be treated as instruments, both by their own commanders and by their 
enem[ies].”  This distinction between those who use force on behalf of, or really at the behest of, 
a state, and those who do not threaten force forms the “foundation” of the key just war principle 
of non-combatant immunity.  That is, non-combatants are strictly immune from attack as they 
have done nothing to lose “their usual rights against attack.”  This is juxtaposed with combatants 
who in the just war tradition “are subject to attack at any time” within the bounds of jus in bello.  
The line between combatants and civilians thus demarks a “fundamental distinction” in the just 
war tradition.        
Combatants receive immunity from the killing they carry out as long as they follow “the rules of 
jus in bello—the rules about how the war is fought.” This holds true regardless of the justness of 
the particular war.  Similar to non-combatant immunity, this combatant immunity appears to 
stem from the connection to the state and the concept that because combatants “have no control 
over the sort of war that their leaders decide to wage, it would be unfair to label [their] actions 
criminal…[combatants]…have control over military matters, not political decisions” regarding 
going to war.  Obeying in bello rules is arguably a condition for qualification as a combatant, 
although this is disputable.  In sum, given that in bello rules “prohibit aiming force at non-
combatants,” the just war tradition compels the additional requirement of distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants.  Much of the principles of distinction are “legally enshrined” in 
both the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 as well as the subsequent Geneva Convention and 
Geneva Protocols (e.g. Protocol I) discussed briefly in the next section.       
Codified Combatant-Civilian Principles 
Protocol I provides plainly that “members of the armed forces of a party to a 
conflict…are combatants” and that in the interest of protecting the civilian population 
“combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population” while attacking 
or preparing to attack.   However, when there are situations where an armed combatant cannot 
distinguish himself he retains his status as a combatant “provided that, in such situations, he 
carries his arms openly” during each military engagement and “during such time as he is visible 
to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an 
attack.”   
Other specific just war factors used for discerning combatants from civilians can be gleaned from 
the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I.  For instance, the Geneva Conventions required 
organized resistance movements in the wake of World War II to meet “the six conditions of 
combatancy” established by the Conventions for members of militia groups, including “being 
organized, being under responsible command, belonging to a party to the conflict, wearing a 
fixed distinctive sign, carrying weapons openly, and complying with the customs and law of 
war.”  Similarly the just war thinker Michael Walzer notes that soldiers, as opposed to civilians, 
are “trained to fight, provided with weapons, required to fight on command,” and war is not 
“their personal enterprise…[b]ut it is the enterprise of their class.”  
The 1907 Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions, both representative in large part of 
the just war tradition, bestow the two primary benefits on combatants:  prisoner of war status and 
combatant immunity from prosecution for acts committed during war.  Along with these two 
codified benefits comes the chief detriment of combatant status, that is, vulnerability in bello to 
targeting at “any time, wherever located, regardless of the duties in which he or she is engaged.”   
IHL and the Current Conflict  
Aspects of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) are highly relevant to kill-capture 
missions against al Qaeda and questions of targeted killing more broadly.  Indeed, a primary goal 
of IHL is to protect civilians.  Morover, IHL, embodied in the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocols, largely comprises the in bello restrictions placed on combatants.   
The conflict with al-Qaeda and its associates, the context in which kill-capture operations have 
been taking place, has been deemed a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC) under IHL 
according to the United States Supreme Court.  As such, the conflict is subject to Common 
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  The NIAC categorization “encompasses armed 
conflicts pitting a state against a non-state actor” and in NIACs actual combatant status does not 
exist.  This lack of combatant status in the NIAC context is because states have “traditionally 
resisted recognition of the combatant’s privilege and [incidentally] eligibility for POW status for 
non-state actors who take up arms to challenge the state….”  Sometimes called “unlawful” or 
“unprivileged” combatants, civilians who “directly engage in hostilities” can be prosecuted under 
domestic law in their detaining state for their belligerency in the NIAC context.  Moreover, 
“traditional rules of jus in bello deny protected status to [these] civilians” directly participating in 
the armed conflict.  Civilians are protected by IHL and are protected from the use of force 
“unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”   
These rules of IHL, along with the broader principles of just war theory sketched in the 
preceding sections, provide the theoretical, conceptual and in some cases “black letter” legal 
bases for the combatant-civilian distinction.  Together they could be said to form a traditional 
combatant-civilian framework deriving from what Walzer would call the “War Convention”—
the “set of articulated norms, customs, professional codes, legal precepts, religious and 
philosophical principles, and reciprocal arrangements” that influence decisions of military 
conduct.  Where actions by and actions against terrorist fighters such as al Qaeda do not 
comfortably square with just war principles because of the traditional combatant-civilian 
framework we must nonetheless ground our justifications for any intentional killing of these 
actors somewhere.  It is this need for justification that compels the creation of a third conceptual 
category for these combatants deriving from the traditional just war combatant-civilian 
framework, a conceptual category that because of its roots in just war traditions should in turn 
lend theoretical clarity to moral and legal issues surrounding kill-capture missions.   
 
     
 Alternative Belligerents  
The moral and legal sticking points surrounding kill-capture missions sought to be 
addressed by this paper hinge in large part on the question of whether terrorists are combatants or 
civilians.  The answer to this question as argued by this paper—that terrorists are neither 
combatants nor civilians (non-combatants) in the just war tradition upon which this paper is 
premised—gives rise to the necessity of a third category, alternative belligerents.  Once the 
alternative belligerency category is established we can invoke the new framework implicated by 
the introduction of a third category to address questions posed at the outset specific to the 
burgeoning kill-capture “surgical” warfare policy, such as the extent of the duty to capture rather 
than kill.    
These Fighters are Not Combatants 
 
Perhaps the most obvious way in which terrorist groups are not combatants in the just 
war sense is the failure of these groups to meet the principle of distinction.  Al Qaeda “does 
not…wear uniforms, [or] carry its arms openly,” nor does al-Qaeda generally coordinate its 
fighters in classic military fashion.  The failure of terrorists to heed the principle of distinction 
has some important implications in the just war tradition.  First, it does not set combatants apart 
“from the world of peaceful activity.”  The requirement of a uniform or some shared mark, as 
well as the alternative requirement to bear arms openly under circumstances where uniforms are 
not worn, is not only a principle codified by Protocol I but also has the implication of shifting a 
risk typically borne by conventional combatants onto civilians.  Failure to make oneself stand out 
from the civilian population as a combatant in turn impinges on the principle of non-combatant 
immunity.  Traditional combatants wear uniforms to mark themselves as the ones open to attack.  
Terrorist groups like al Qaeda, alternative belligerents, largely hide among the civilian 
population secluding their purpose and motives, particularly at the moment of attack.  When 
fighters are not distinctive legitimate targets become blurred to the detriment of civilians.     
That terrorist fighters have no state affiliation further argues against their status as combatants.  
Not only do traditional combatants set themselves apart for purposes of distinction, but the 
burden they carry when they set themselves apart is typically the burden of the state on whose 
behalf they fight.  State affiliation is a traditional principle underlying just war theory and failure 
to be affiliated with a state effectively eliminates the principle of combatant immunity.  
Traditional just war theory gives soldiers immunity for their in bello actions, regardless of the 
overall ad bellum reasons for war, in large part because combatants are “human instruments” of 
the state who are not responsible for the political conduct that may have resulted in war.  Under 
this framework there is a moral equality in bello because the soldiers on either side are not 
responsible for the justness of the actions resulting in war, and neither side implicates their own 
moral innocence by killing the other.  Terrorist fighters like al Qaeda who target civilian 
populations do however detract from their moral innocence through the act of intentionally 
targeting civilians.  In doing so, they skew the principles of moral equality of combatants and 
also combatant immunity. In turn they undermine merits of their own status as combatants.   
Some have advanced that a further condition for bestowing combatant status under traditional 
just war theory is that of actually obeying in bello restrictions.  Those who violate the laws of 
war, the argument goes, cannot be combatants and are instead illegal or “illegitimate 
combatants.”  It appears that little hard evidence for such a proposition exists in traditional just 
war sources.  Article 44 (2) of Protocol I states that “violations of these rules shall not deprive a 
combatant of his right to be a combatant.”  This dispute, between those who believe that 
violation of in bello restrictions results in loss of combatant status and those who do not believe 
such an assertion calls to light an important point.  To think that a member of al Qaeda’s 
violation of in bello restrictions does not “deprive a combatant of his right,” or alternatively, that 
violation of the Protocol would strip a combatant of their combatant rights necessarily presumes 
that the actor at issue was a combatant from the start.  Arguments such as those advanced by 
John Yoo seem to assume that if terrorist fighters merely started obeying certain in bello 
restrictions—ceased targeting civilians for example—these fighters might then be considered 
combatants.  This argument does not hold because regardless of al Qaeda’s conformity to in 
bello rules they do not fit the broader traditional just war concept of combatancy from the start.  
They are not instruments of any state or “‘poor sods’…trapped in a war they didn’t make,” and 
in turn their actions erode the notion of the moral equality of combatants.  Unlike the work of 
John Yoo this paper does not purport to establish terrorist fighters as a pseudo-third category by 
virtue of their “illegitimate” or illegal actions.  Instead, recognizing that terrorist fighters do not 
comport with moral or legal foundations of either combatant or civilian status in the just war 
tradition, it seeks to define a third category based on the moral space these fighters occupy.   
These Fighters are Not Civilians  
One argument that fighters like al Qaeda’s are not civilians lies in the fact that, like state 
sponsored military organizations, terrorist groups are hierarchical organizations with a fairly 
clear chain of command.  This just war characteristic as an aspect of combatant status is 
embodied in the Geneva Conventions.  Indeed, American intelligence officials seem to know a 
great deal about the structure, breadth, and complex chain of command of these organizations.  
That terrorist organizations are organized hierarchies with a chain of command may weigh 
against conveying civilian status on these fighters but it still does little to establish a moral 
ground justifying their targeting as traditional combatants.  A strong case that terrorists are 
clearly not civilians, but still not combatants because of the factors in the preceding section, can 
only be made when their organizational capacity is considered as it synchronizes with the scale 
of harm such groups threaten and actually have carried out. 
Within a war context the harm that al Qaeda threatens speaks to the degree to which they and 
affiliated terrorist groups are not “innocent.”  Elizabeth Anscombe describes the “innocent” in 
war as “all those who are not fighting and not engaged in supplying those who are with the 
means of fighting.”
 
  Innocent in this sense refers not to matters of personal guilt, but rather to 
those who are not harming in war.  On this view, the people fighting, the combatants, are 
harming and thus can be attacked whereas those who are not harming may not be attacked.  
Surely that al Qaeda could be said to be fighting or harming is beyond reasonable dispute.  
Admittedly however the innocent versus non-innocent distinction applies to the context of war 
and thus can only lend credence to the argument that al Qaeda fighters are not civilians if we can 
properly see the struggle against al Qaeda as a war in a broader sense.  Although thorough 
discussion on whether the conflict with al Qaeda and its affiliates is properly viewed, ad bellum, 
as “war” in its traditional sense is well beyond the scope of this paper, a good case that the fight 
with al Qaeda is a war exists and is one this paper adopts for purposes of the argument.   
The scale of the harm that terrorists are capable of inflicting and have inflicted cannot be 
underestimated.  To be sure, their attacks are on a level that has caused the Obama administration 
to continue to view the group’s actions from the war paradigm: “we are at war with al-Qa’ida. In 
an indisputable act of aggression, al-Qa’ida attacked our nation and killed nearly 3,000 innocent 
people…al-Qa’ida seeks to attack us again.”  Indeed, al Qaeda has carried on a steady assault 
against the United States in which the September 11th attacks amount to what has been called a 
“decapitation strike”
 
 strategically delivered with the intention of eliminating various civilian and 
military leaders of the United States in one fell swoop.  Al Qaeda has also made, for what it is 
worth, an affirmative declaration of war against the United States and has clearly articulated 
goals of “kill[ing] Americans” and “get[ting] rid of them.”  The harm al Qaeda and its affiliates 
are capable of is amplified by the group’s alleged efforts to obtain nuclear and chemical 
weapons, a possibility recently described as “[t]he single biggest threat to U.S. security.”  This 
scale of harm also distinguishes terrorist groups from other groups such as gangs or organized 
crime rings perpetrating harm on a less massive scale and typically against each other or rival 
non-state groups.  These considerations support the case that the fight against al Qaeda is 
properly viewed in the context of war.     
In such a context the organizational capacity as well as the scale and complexity of the harm 
threatened by al Qaeda means al Qaeda’s fighters run afoul of properly being considered 
civilians.  However, is even this enough to say members of groups like al Qaeda are not properly 
viewed as civilians?  If it were it seems that members of any hierarchical non-state affiliated 
group that perpetrate large scale violence should not be viewed as civilians.  It would probably 
still be considered a “crime” perpetrated by “criminals,” as opposed to an act of war perpetrated 
by combatants (non-civilians), if for example the Mafia detonated a nuclear device in New York 
City.  One could argue, and the United States appears to adopt the position, that where the only 
appropriate response to an attack requires mobilization of the military this may inherently mean 
that the group being dealt with is non-civilian in nature.     
Let me instead offer another argument however that distinguishes the “Mafia gone awry on 
civilians” example from al Qaeda and its affiliates, and that pertains to the intrinsic sociopolitical 
motivations of al Qaeda.  The just war tradition places a special emphasis on the notion that 
combatants fight on behalf of a state.  That al Qaeda possesses political motivations like leaders 
of a state who send troops into battle is indicative of al Qaeda not being civilian in any traditional 
sense.  However, it must be acknowledged that this observation has important implications on 
the concept of combatant immunity if we are to stretch it to its logical conclusion.  As stated, the 
traditional view holds that combatants are immune in battle at least in part because they are in no 
way responsible for the actions of the leaders who sent them to war.  The justness of their cause 
does not factor in to the analysis because they chose only to fight, not against whom and why 
they would fight.  Al Qaeda on the other hand, having no sovereign commanding them, picks 
their battles so to speak.  They very much have control over “military matters” as well as 
“political decisions.”  This implicates the moral equality of combatants, and as this paper 
addresses, speaks to appropriate responses to these belligerents in the kill-capture mission 
context.   
An additional argument that al Qaeda cannot be considered traditional just war civilians or 
combatants stems from the issues surrounding the notion of direct participation in hostilities 
(DPH).  The DPH principle at first glance seems to support this paper’s position that terrorists 
are neither combatants nor civilians, but Article 51 (3) does not appear to embody this upon 
closer inspection.  DPH, if it is in fact applicable to al Qaeda, first implies that actors directly 
participating in hostilities are not combatants in the traditional sense because the DPH principle 
does not formally group these actors with “combatants.”  The actor under Protocol I article 51 
(3) begins as a civilian and moves to a civilian “directly participating.”  This is not necessarily a 
combatant although they are for a fleeting time linked to and targetable like combatants.  The 
DPH principle also supports the fact that terrorist groups like al Qaeda are not “civilians.”  This 
is because although they are not combatants, they are actually participating in armed conflict.  
They are harming, pose a threat and are not “innocent.”  DPH seems to counsel that they are not 
pure civilians.  They are not civilians in that they are the opposite of combatants evoked by the 
negated combatant term, “non-combatant.”  They are instead a strain of civilian, the strain that is 
related to combatants by virtue of directly participating in hostilities.  IHL has non-combatancy 
as the default position for these fighters.  Thus, IHL’s DPH category is not on point with the 
position taken by this paper that the default position for fighters like al Qaeda and their affiliates 
lies in a category for “alternative belligerents”—a distinct conceptual category and status used to 
classify these fighters who truly are neither combatant nor civilian.   
Alternative Belligerency 
Up to now this paper has discussed the traditional just war combatant-civilian framework 
and has argued that members of terrorist organizations like al Qaeda cannot be considered either 
combatants or civilians in the traditional just war sense.  The moral and legal framework 
supporting the traditional combatant-civilian distinction does not comport with warfare with al 
Qaeda.  This is so neither in our surgical attacks on them nor in their attacks on innocent 
civilians.  By not adhering to the principle of distinction alternative belligerents undermine 
civilian immunity principles.  By not fighting at the behest of a nation state alternative 
belligerents undermine traditional foundations of combatant immunity.  By intentionally 
mounting attacks on civilians alternative belligerents detract from their own moral innocence, 
skewing the moral equality of combatancy.  That these fighters do not comport with the 
traditional combatant civilian framework in turn compels the creation of a third conceptual 
category of fighters.  While various accounts have ambled toward moral or legal solutions by 
categorizing al Qaeda’s terrorist fighters as either a strain of combatant or a strain of civilian, this 
paper advocates a completely distinct third group that could simply be called alternative 
belligerents.  Through this category we can more fully take into account the unique moral status 
of terrorist fighters while leaving the traditional combatant-civilian distinction untouched.  
Conventional war between combatants could still be governed by traditional just war notions of 
combatant and civilian status.  Terrorist fighters on the other hand would fit the alternative 
belligerent category and war with alternative belligerents would be conducted with moral 
restraints unique to the moral status of the fighters involved.   
 
Alternative Belligerents and Kill-Capture 
Merely establishing that terrorist fighters do not fit the traditional conceptions of just war 
combatants and civilians and then arguing that this compels the creation of a third distinct 
theoretical category does little good without examining the resulting implications and limitations 
of such an approach.  This is particularly the case when the group displays the unconventional 
and nebulous characteristics of alternative belligerents.  How for instance do we know who is an 
alternative belligerent?  As such, what are the resulting duties in the new style of “surgical 
warfare” that has proven effective in responding to these belligerents:  when should we capture 
rather than kill?  How can this new category inform the conduct of kill-capture missions?     
Parameters of Alternative Belligerency 
This paper has defined the alternative belligerency category by reference to the 
characteristics specifically of al Qaeda as the model of an alternative belligerent force.  It follows 
that future groups of fighters who fall into the mold of al Qaeda could similarly be categorized as 
alternative belligerents.  The key factors for this categorization revealed in the sections on 
combatant and civilian status consist of the lack of a connection to a nation-state specific 
political mandate, failure to adhere to the principle of distinction despite having a complex 
hierarchical structure, and the infliction of mass harm on civilians as well as military and 
political leaders through what essentially constitute advanced acts of war.    These factors 
implicate al Qaeda as a third category and would similarly implicate future groups and currently 
related groups where putting them into either the combatant or civilian just war category results 
in the breakdown of the moral underpinnings of those categories.  However, questions remain as 
to how specific individuals might be said to be a part of the alternative belligerent force just 
described.  Merely declaring that a separate category exists is unhelpful in practice without 
advancing ways that rightly connect individual fighters to the alternative belligerent group.     
The concept of “linking” could be useful in a context where conventional combatants are 
targeting alternative belligerents such as in kill-capture missions.  Jens Ohlin posits correctly that 
under the traditional principles embodied in IHL “the individual must be linked to a larger 
collective—a larger belligerent force…it is only when [a particular fighter’s] relationship to a 
larger collective is considered that the use of force against them may be permissible.”  Ohlin in 
turn advances that “voluntary membership in an organization engaged in an armed conflict with 
the United States” logically suffices as a linking principle that is “a functional equivalent to 
being a member of a military organization” and thus in harmony with IHL.  We can usefully 
employ Ohlin’s linking principle straightforwardly in the possible targeting of alternative 
belligerents.  Where a suspected member of al Qaeda is found to be a voluntary member of that 
group and has not publicly renounced their membership, they may be susceptible to targeting, 
including targeted killing in the context of a kill-capture mission.  Linking an individual to an 
alternative belligerent group could qualify them as an alternative belligerent.  However, simply 
knowing that an individual is an alternative belligerent does not deal with issues of the 
legitimacy of the response to the alternative belligerent’s actions where combatants and 
alternative belligerents are not moral equals.   
 
    
Moral Inequality and Targeting Alternative Belligerents 
Explication of the reasons why alternative belligerents are neither civilians nor 
combatants in the traditional just war sense reveals that the traditional notion of the moral 
equality of combatants likely does not apply to armed conflict between alternative belligerents 
and traditional combatants.  For example, as explained above, by intentionally targeting civilians 
alternative belligerents detract from their moral innocence, rendering the concept of the moral 
equality of combatants less applicable.  If we accept however that traditional combatants and 
alternative belligerents are not moral equals this does not remove limits to the conduct of both 
parties at war.  Quite the opposite, viewing alternative belligerents and combatants as morally 
unequal may actually provide the fix and guide appropriate responses to alternative belligerents 
in the context of kill-capture missions.   
Philosopher Jeff McMahan has argued, contrary to just war theory, that traditional combatants 
are more properly viewed as morally unequal.  In such a context, the “criterion of liability to 
attack in war is not merely that one poses a threat to another” but more is required.  The person 
upon whom force is being used must be “morally responsible for posing an objectively 
unjustified threat.”  Starting at this foundation and the implication that such an approach must 
recon with “various forms and degrees of responsibility, and therefore also of liability,” 
McMahan constructs a spectrum of liability to attack whereupon liability to attack changes in 
degree along with the culpability of the threat.  At one extreme are those who are fully liable to 
attack because they “have neither justification nor excuse” and are fully culpable for their 
actions.  At the other end are those “non-responsible threats,” those who “without justification 
threaten[] to harm someone in a way to which [they][are] not liable, but who [are] in no way 
morally responsible for doing so” and thus are not liable to attack.  Underlying the specific 
categories McMahan offers in between these two poles of liability is the concept of 
proportionality of a response.  Where it is suitable to respond with perhaps even disproportionate 
force to a culpable threat, as one works across the spectrum eventually reaching those who are 
less culpable there are varying degrees of justifications and excuses for those in between and in 
turn the legitimate responses to the liability of these actors changes.    
 Applying this framework to the morally unequal ground beneath traditional combatants 
and alternative belligerents is instructive in the kill-capture context.  Let us take for example the 
hypothetical at the start of this paper, the targeting of Osama bin Laden.  Bin Laden intended 
further harm on the United States.  His actions in perpetrating and planning previous terrorist 
attacks, rooted in religious and political zealotry, were without justification or excuse.  
Considering further his continued membership in the organization and his critical leadership of al 
Qaeda bin Laden was fully liable to “necessary and appropriate defensive action” where bin 
Laden was fully culpable.  But most other cases, at least given the confines of public information 
not made confidential for purposes of national security, are not so clear cut and this is where a 
sliding scale framework like McMahan’s could be particularly helpful in the kill-capture context 
dealing with alternative belligerents.  Consider the second hypothetical at the outset where an 
alternative belligerent is less of a known leader than bin Laden, or where their actions are 
significantly less culpable, albeit still not justified or excusable.  Perhaps they are a member of al 
Qaeda so as to be sufficiently linked as an alternative belligerent but their actual activities are 
geared toward communications, recruiting and logistical support.  In such situations the 
proportional response, drawing on the reasoning of McMahan’s work, is likely something less 
than a targeted killing.  Such a scenario would counsel for capture rather than a targeted killing 
based on the degree of the target’s liability considering the detailed factors specific to that 
individual.   
 
Conclusion 
The framework proposed by this paper does not purport to solve all of the problems of 
the moral and legal legitimacy of kill-capture missions in international law and traditional just 
war theory.  What this paper does do however is carve out a distinct conceptual category based 
on the premise that terrorist fighters such as al Qaeda cannot be made to fit either of the two 
traditional just war categories of combatant or civilian.  From this acknowledgement that terrorist 
groups fit neither category we can begin to construct moral foundations for examining legitimate 
military operations against these actors, as this paper has sought to do, based on the belief that 
any intentional killing must always be justified. 
Arguments could be advanced that terrorist groups are either combatants or non-combatants and 
should be treated as such.  Or, one could argue that an understanding that terrorist groups are 
neither combatants nor civilians does not necessarily compel the creation of a third category and 
only complicates matters practically as well as morally.  These points all remain subject to 
further dispute in spite of this paper’s work.  The fact remains however that the threat that 
alternative belligerents pose to the United States and other nations and individuals is significant 
and the responses must be appropriate.  Regardless of the form in which the threat comes it is the 
state that “actually has the authority to order deliberate killing in order to protect its people or to 
put frightful injustices right.”  This authority should not be taken lightly, but also does not entail 
the forfeiture of the moral constraints that have guided just wars in the past.   
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